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STARE DECISIS IS FOR PIRATES
JESSE D.H. SNYDER*
I. Introduction
The legal podcast Strict Scrutiny has adopted, and is merchandising, the
catchy phrase, “Stare decisis is for suckers.”1 Doubtless the phrase is a rally
cry for a podcast whose platform is “unvarnished, respectfully irreverent
takes” on the U.S. Supreme Court.2 But before purchasing the hat or hoodie
with the phrase emblazoned, it is worth asking to whom are the suckers the
podcast is referring?
Professor Richard Re suggests that stare decisis is a jurist-centered
concept, where “precedent works as a shortcut by helping judges and
justices decide cases quickly and lawfully by telling them that it is
allowable to follow the path laid by past rulings,” while “operat[ing] as a
shield by encouraging judges who have been critical of precedent to put
aside their past views (whether publicly expressed or not) and start
respecting stare decisis.”3 Perhaps sensing the tenor of the times, Circuit
Judge Jerry E. Smith of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
writing on the losing end of a 2-1 decision in March 2020, accused his
panel members of “rely[ing] on strength in numbers rather than sound legal
principles in order to reach their desired result in [a] specific case.”4 He
* 2016–2017 Law Clerk to the Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr. of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; 2015–2016 Law Clerk to the Honorable Jimmie V. Reyna of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; 2012–2013 Law Clerk to the Honorable
Jorge A. Solis of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. I earned my J.D.,
summa cum laude, from Texas Wesleyan University and my B.S. from the United States Air
Force Academy. I would like to thank the entire staff of the Oklahoma Law Review,
particularly the top-notch work of Allyson E. Shumaker, Hammons P. Hepner, and Michael
F. Waters. I also would like to give a warm shout out to my wife, Amy, for all her support.
1. See Merchandise, STRICT SCRUTINY PODCAST, https://strict-scrutiny-podcastshop.myshopify.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2020).
2. See About, STRICT SCRUTINY PODCAST, https://strictscrutinypodcast.com/about/ (last
visited Sept. 1, 2020).
3. Richard M. Re, Is “Stare Decisis . . . for Suckers”?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 24, 2020,
8:30 AM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2020/03/is-stare-decisis-for-suckers.
html.
4. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., 952 F.3d 591, 603 (5th
Cir.) (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 913 F.3d 573, 574 (5th
Cir. 2019) (mem.), rev’d sub nom. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103
(2020)), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 953 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2020).
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then observed something never before uttered in a publicly available,
published opinion: “[S]tare decisis is for suckers.”5 And, as singer/rapper
Lizzo is wont to say, “Truth hurts.”6 But are there suckers out there with
greater importance beyond judges and justices?
The “struggle . . . over the role of stare decisis” is real when parties
request that the Supreme Court overrule its own precedent.7 And with
conservatives and progressives “largely talking past each other, the debate
is certain to continue, unabated and unresolved” for the foreseeable future.8
Endemic in this struggle is that the justices, at times, disagree about what
standard or considerations (if any) should apply when deciding whether to
adhere to stare decisis or overrule caselaw.9 When the current justices have
articulated some of their considerations used to decide whether to overrule
decisions, those considerations appear cabined to “the quality of the
decision’s reasoning; its consistency with related decisions; legal
developments since the decision; and reliance on the decision.”10 Lack of
consensus has led some justices to claim in dissent that “it is not enough
that five Justices believe a precedent wrong,” and that each overruling “can
only cause one to wonder which cases the Court will overrule next.”11
Although not always appreciated, the public are certainly among those
wondering along with the dissenters.
5. Id.
6. LIZZO, Truth Hurts, on CUZ I LOVE YOU (SUPER DELUXE) (Atlantic Records 2019).
7. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Supreme Court Precedent,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 2, 2019, 9:54 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/10/scotus-forlaw-students-supreme-court-precedent/.
8. Id.
9. Compare Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“In my view, if the Court encounters a decision that is demonstrably
erroneous—i.e., one that is not a permissible interpretation of the text—the Court should
correct the error, regardless of whether other factors support overruling the precedent.”),
with id. at 1969 (majority opinion) (“[I]n constitutional cases, a departure from precedent
‘demands special justification.’ . . . This means that something more than ‘ambiguous
historical evidence’ is required before we will ‘flatly overrule a number of major decisions
of this Court.’” (first quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984); and then
quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 479 (1987))), and
id. at 2008 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“And when ‘far-reaching systemic and structural
changes’ make an ‘earlier error all the more egregious and harmful,’ stare decisis can lose its
force.” (quoting South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018))).
10. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019) (citations omitted).
11. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2189, 2190 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
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The modern conversation about stare decisis, tellingly, is largely juristcentric, relegating the interests of individuals in established precedent to the
discrete category of “reliance.”12 The hyper-focus on quality of reasoning
and jurisprudential workability has led to a philosophical debate red in
tooth and claw among the justices and lower-court judges, not least because
that level of abstraction resists limits and dulls objectivity.
But if the focus shifted toward the public as the would-be sucker, as
opposed to the justices and judges, then a system built to serve the former
will orient toward how best to protect them when the latter contemplate
whether to overrule cases. This shift recognizes that individuals are the ones
who stand to gain or lose the most when judges decide whether stare decisis
matters. If judges are no longer the primary suckers who matter, the outsize
debate about precedent gravitates away from erudition and correctness. The
untrammeled lens of stare decisis, sharpened by evidentiary and
quantifiable considerations, instead can focus on how people have arranged
their affairs and acclimated to a prior decision. In other words, norms
overtake theory.
October Term 2019 produced a decision that could serve as a model for a
more norms-based, less jurist-centric, approach to stare decisis. The
decision considered whether North Carolina could be sued for copyright
infringement over its use of materials covering the pirate ship, Queen
Anne’s Revenge.13 In Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court demonstrated
how to focus less on the learnedness of past decisions and more on the
parties’ ability to provide evidence justifying society’s demand that a past
decision be discarded.14 The Court admitted that Eleventh Amendment
12. See Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1499.
13. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 (2020).
In 1717, the pirate Edward Teach, better known as Blackbeard, captured a
French slave ship in the West Indies and renamed her Queen Anne’s Revenge.
The vessel became his flagship. Carrying some 40 cannons and 300 men, the
Revenge took many prizes as she sailed around the Caribbean and up the North
American coast. But her reign over those seas was short-lived. In 1718, the ship
ran aground on a sandbar a mile off Beaufort, North Carolina. Blackbeard and
most of his crew escaped without harm. Not so for the Revenge. She sank
beneath the waters, where she lay undisturbed for nearly 300 years.
Id.
14. See id. at 1003 (“Allen offers us nothing special at all; he contends only that if the
Court were to use a clause-by-clause approach, it would discover that Florida Prepaid was
wrong (because, he says again, the decision misjudged Congress’s authority under the
Intellectual Property Clause).”).
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precedents are rooted in reasoning “nowhere explicitly set out in the
Constitution.”15 No big deal. That is so because the Court adjusted its focus
from a critique of the past to an inquisition into whether the parties could
supply evidence justifying why the current result should differ under
analogous facts.16 In applying an approach tilted away from the justices and
their predecessors, the Court accepted and applied the relevant precedents,
explained that the parties proffered “nothing special” to deviate from them,
and concluded without much trouble that Congress did not properly
abrogate state sovereign immunity for lawsuits alleging piracy of
copyrighted materials.17 The decision was civil, without concurring or
dissenting aspersions. And it was punctilious to the point where only a
sunken pirate ship could make the case lively. Yet the Court’s analysis
made it clear that if any sucker was going to walk the plank in failed faith to
stare decisis, it was the parties’ burden to nudge them along by showing
how society had changed.
This Article argues that the fraught debate about the role of stare decisis
cannot depressurize unless and until the focus of its application shifts away
from baroque analysis of judicial erudition and towards the ways in which
normative expectations of society have adjusted, and continue to adjust, to
precedent. The Article proceeds in two parts. It first explains the role of
stare decisis in the American legal system. It then observes how Allen v.
Cooper offers an exemplar in decision-making on the application of stare
decisis. The decision demonstrates less concern for judges qua judges,
according greater attention instead to how people are impacted by the
prospect of overruling a decision. No one wants to be a sucker. Certainly
not judges. Nor pirates. To these ends, adjusting the telescopic lens of stare
decisis to accentuate norms-based, public concerns avoids consigning
litigants and the public writ large to something even worse than being a
sucker—an afterthought.
II. The Role of Stare Decisis in the American Legal System
Stare decisis is a malleable concept, not least because it is moored in
common-law traditions that resist easy formulation.18 The justices and
15. Id. at 1000.
16. See id. at 1003.
17. See id. at 1003, 1005–07.
18. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1982–83 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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judges, then, ultimately decide whether stare decisis is a default rule or an
exception to the normal operation of deciding cases. This Part discusses the
development of stare decisis in the American legal system and then
explains its role as applied by the current Supreme Court justices.
A. The Difficulty in Deciding Whether to Stand by the Past
The Latin translation of stare decisis is “to stand by things decided.”19
Stare decisis generally refers to standing by the rules established in prior
cases.20 The doctrine has two general strains: vertical and horizontal stare
decisis. Put most simply, decisions from higher courts are binding on lower
courts under vertical stare decisis, whereas decisions outside of a court’s
hierarchy are viewed as merely persuasive under horizontal stare decisis.21
Only a higher court’s consideration of its own binding precedent presents
the stare decisis difficulty: overrule or follow.22
As explained by Professor Stephen Wermiel, the debate in the Supreme
Court over whether to overrule precedent is all-consuming when
interpreting the Constitution, as opposed to statutes, because “[i]f there is
dissatisfaction with the court’s interpretation of a federal law, the logic
goes, Congress can amend the law to correct the problem.”23 “With
constitutional interpretation, however, justices feel freer to change course if
they believe correction is needed, because the only alternative is amending
the Constitution.”24 The sense of greater latitude to revisit constitutional
decisions has contributed to the anxiety that anything and everything could
change, constitutionally speaking, as one justice is nominated, confirmed,
and replaces another.25 Justice Byron R. White all but admitted as much
19. Wermiel, supra note 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Id.
21. Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: The Strength of Precedent Is in the Justices’
Actions, Not Words, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 28, 2018, 2:11 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2018/11/empirical-scotus-the-strength-of-precedent-is-in-the-justices-actions-not-words/.
22. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 1861, 1910 (2014) (“Not only do lower courts lack the authority to overrule Supreme
Court decisions, but their localized efforts at narrowing also pose much greater risks of
creating doctrinal fragmentation.” (footnote omitted)); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article
III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2025 (1994) (“A lower court must always follow a higher
court’s precedents.”).
23. Wermiel, supra note 7.
24. Id.
25. See id. (“[Justice] Breyer warned that it is ‘dangerous to overrule a decision only
because five Members of a later Court come to agree with earlier dissenters on a difficult
legal question.’”).
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when he quipped, as each new justice joins the Court, “it’s a different
court.”26 If so, the Court has been an evolution in progress since the
eighteenth century.
Sir William Blackstone explained in 1765 that stare decisis
“[e]stablished customs” along with “rules and maxims” articulated by
judges.27 Under the common-law tradition, “judicial decisions [were] the
principal and most authoritative evidence, that [could] be given, of the
existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law.”28 Sir
Blackstone admonished that “precedents and rules must be followed, unless
flatly absurd or unjust,” because a judge must make decisions “according to
the known laws and customs of the land,” and not “according to his private
sentiments” or “own private judgment.”29 Judge-made decisions thus “were
seen as principles that had been discovered rather than new laws that were
being made.”30 Writing in Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton also
emphasized the important purpose of stare decisis: to “avoid an arbitrary
discretion in the courts, it is indispensable” that federal judges “should be
bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point
out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.”31
Although rarely discussed explicitly in current cases, there is no
reasonable dispute that constitutional interpretation remains a modern-day
exercise in discovering meaning through common-law traditions.32 The
Supreme Court made this point clear in the nineteenth century:
It is common sense and not merely the blessing of the Framers
that explains this Court’s frequent reminders that: “The
interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is
necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed

26. Linda Greenhouse, Every Justice Creates a New Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/opinion/27greenhouse.html.
27. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68–69.
28. Id. at *69.
29. Id. at *69–70.
30. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–35, at
129 (1988).
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
32. See, e.g., Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (2020) (“In our constitutional
scheme, a federal court generally may not hear a suit brought by any person against a
nonconsenting State. That bar is nowhere explicitly set out in the Constitution.”).
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in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in
the light of its history.” 33
That is so because the document “nowhere defines the meaning of” many of
its words and phrases, suggesting that “it must be interpreted in the light of
the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known
to the framers of the Constitution.”34 Any denial of federal common law
refuses to grapple with, at least, how courts have interpreted—and continue
to interpret—the Constitution.35 The tradition of Sir Blackstone, then, is
constitutional interpretation through discovery and reliance on past
discoveries to find new ones. Only once “flatly absurd or unjust” does an
interpretation become “not law.”36
The Supreme Court did not address stare decisis in a meaningful way
until the mid-nineteenth century. In Cook v. Moffat, Justice Robert Cooper
Grier plainly paid respect to the jurists who had authored the precedent just
twenty years earlier: “But as the questions involved in it have already
received the most ample investigation by the most eminent and profound
jurists, both of the bar and the bench, it may be well doubted whether
further discussion will shed more light, or produce a more satisfactory or
unanimous decision.”37 He concluded that, “at least, as the present case is
concerned, the court do[es] not think it necessary or prudent to depart from
the safe maxim of stare decisis.”38 The Supreme Court never again
described stare decisis as a “safe maxim” in those exact words. Indeed, if
stare decisis once offered safety, that virtue appears drowned by later
justifications, both for and against, following precedent.
Roughly fifty years later, toward the turn of the twentieth century,
judicial attitudes about stare decisis began to change. In a dispute over
customs and duties, Justice David Josiah Brewer became one of the first
justices to attribute the outcome of a case to a change in the Court’s

33. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 175–76 (1973) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888)).
34. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898) (citations omitted).
35. See Rodriguez v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 140 S. Ct. 713, 717 (2020) (explaining
that there is “no federal general common law” but “[i]nstead, only limited areas exist in
which federal judges may appropriately craft the rule of decision”).
36. BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *70.
37. See Cook v. Moffat, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 295, 309 (1847).
38. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

252

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:245

composition: “A change in the personnel of a court should not mean a shift
in the law. Stare decisis is the rule, and not the exception.”39
Rules and their exceptions, however, can change places. Over 100 years
after Justice Brewer’s statement, Justice John Paul Stevens crystalized that
underlying sentiment in his forceful dissent to in Citizens United v. FEC, a
decision that overruled precedent permitting limits on federal campaign
expenditures:
Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of
the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves
an opportunity to change the law. . . . But if [stare decisis] is to
do any meaningful work in supporting the rule of law, it must at
least demand a significant justification, beyond the preferences
of five Justices, for overturning settled doctrine.40
He also castigated the majority’s refusal to acknowledge evidence in favor
of stare decisis:
Yet the basic shape and trajectory of 20th-century campaign
finance reform are clear, and one need not take a naïve or
triumphalist view of this history to find it highly relevant. The
Court’s skepticism does nothing to mitigate the absurdity of its
claim that Austin and McConnell were outliers. Nor does it alter
the fact that five Justices today destroy a longstanding American
practice.41
Then, as now, Justice Brewer was onto something that grew as the
twentieth century progressed.
In 1938, one year after West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish abrogated the
freedom of contract principle announced in Lochner v. New York42 and

39. Hartranft v. Meyer, 149 U.S. 544, 545, 547 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
40. 558 U.S. 310, 395, 398, 408 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
41. Id. at 434 n.59.
42. Compare West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) (“There is no
absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty
does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide department of activity which
consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide restrictive
safeguards.”), with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (“[I]n a private business,
not dangerous in any degree to morals, or in any real and substantial degree to the health of
the employees[,] . . . the freedom of master and employee to contract with each other in
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ushered in a new epoch on constitutional views of the Commerce Clause
and Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Hugo Lafayette Black dissented in an
opinion in which he explained why, notwithstanding stare decisis, he did
“not believe the word ‘person’ in the Fourteenth Amendment includes
corporations.”43 His dissent further expounded that “[t]he doctrine of stare
decisis, however appropriate and even necessary at times, has only a limited
application in the field of constitutional law,” where “[t]his Court has many
times changed its interpretations of the Constitution when the conclusion
was reached that an improper construction had been adopted.”44
Justice Black’s statement seemed to capture what every justice had
silently come to understand. He just said the silent part out loud. It echoed,
too, Justice Louis D. Brandeis’s remark that “no case is ever finally decided
until it is rightly decided.”45
And true enough, breaking from stare decisis has produced some of the
Supreme Court’s greatest moments. In a case overruling precedent on the
government’s ability to compel forced flag saluting, Justice Robert H.
Jackson edified that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”46 Yet the
difficulty in stare decisis lies in understanding when to exercise the
awesome power the public licenses to its servants. For fixed stars can
always burn out, and constellations can likewise fade from view depending
on where you stand.
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of
Education (including Justice Black’s vote as a former Klansmen47) appears
to be the first analysis to command a majority in which countervailing

relation to their employment, and in defining the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered
with, without violating the Federal Constitution.”).
43. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 94 (1936) (Stone and Cardozo, JJ., concurring)).
45. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 223 (1952) (“Mr. Justice Brandeis used to say that no case is ever finally decided
until it is rightly decided.”).
46. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 628–29, 642 (1943).
47. Nicandro Iannacci, Hugo Black, Unabashed Partisan for the Constitution, NAT’L
CONST. CTR. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/hugo-black-unabashedpartisan-for-the-constitution.
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social circumstances overwhelmed stare decisis.48 In overruling the
constitutional interpretation that separate-but-equal facilities are consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equal protection, the Court’s
analysis looked not within itself at past decisions, but rather to forwardleaning societal evidence on “the effect of segregation itself on public
education”:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to
1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when
Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public
education in the light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way
can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives
these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.49
Chief Justice Warren relied on evidence about how the precedents at
issue were affecting American life in 1954 and into the foreseeable future:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms.50

48. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954) (“Whatever may have been the
extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [that
segregation negatively affects educational development] is amply supported by modern
authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.”) (footnote
omitted)).
49. Id. at 492–93.
50. Id. at 493.
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And in overruling nearly fifty years of precedents, Chief Justice Warren
still gave the justices who decided Plessy and its progeny the benefit of the
doubt. As opposed to scrutinizing “the quality of the decision’s
reasoning,”51 the Court charitably suggested that modern evidence was not
available at the time of those decisions.52 Instead of dwelling on the past,
Chief Justice Warren moved on.
Since the “single greatest moment in Supreme Court history,” at least
according to Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh,53 the Court’s treatment of stare
decisis has devolved back to insular inquiries about past insight. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey54 stands as a notable exception. There, the Court
candidly assessed not the quality of a past decision, but “whether the rule is
subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation.”55 It
also considered “whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification.”56 Yet, with no precise formulation ever solemnized by the
Court as to when to let precedent “stand,” applying stare decisis has proved
as elusive and Delphic as when Sir Blackstone wrote about it years before
the Constitution was a glimmer in the framers’ eyes.57 The danger of a
doctrine moored in tenets of predictability, ironically, is its unpredictability
in application.

51. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019); see also Gamble v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Among these factors
are the ‘workability’ of the standard, ‘the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at
stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned.’” (quoting Montejo v.
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792–93 (2009))).
52. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11 (citing modern publications documenting the
psychological effects of segregation).
53. Melissa Quinn, Kavanaugh: Brown v. Board of Education ‘Single Greatest Moment
in Supreme Court History’, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 5, 2018, 2:31 PM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/courts/brett-kavanaugh-brown-v-board-ofeducation-single-greatest-moment-supreme-court-history; see also Ramos v. Louisiana, 140
S. Ct. 1390, 1411–12 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
54. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
55. Id. at 854.
56. Id. at 855.
57. See Wermiel, supra note 7 (“[T]he judges do not appear to agree about what
standards should govern the decision whether to overrule a prior case.”).
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B. Default Rule or Mere Exception
Any restraint posed by stare decisis has abated in recent years. The only
consensus to emerge in this area appears to be that no one has been able to
provide a satisfactory test, standard, or framework around which judges can
coalesce. That is most likely because the doctrine has shrunk to something
“purely permissive in nature.”58
The numbers bear out a diluted doctrine. Since the ratification of the
Constitution on June 21, 1788,59 the Supreme Court has overruled,
implicitly or explicitly, its decisions over 300 times.60 The last seventy
years account for over 200 of those instances.61 This phenomenon could be
explained in two broad strokes. First, the Supreme Court is correcting past
decisions with deleterious effects on society. Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has
made clear his view that “[t]he Supreme Court has largely failed throughout
American history at its most important tasks and at the most important
times.”62 So some measure of cleanup would seem necessary. Another
perhaps more cynical view is that, once ensconced, each justice truly acts to
create a “different court,” in which the temptation to overrule a disliked
decision is far greater than the Framers could have anticipated.63
The current justices appear to agree that stare decisis “promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process.”64 Yet the justices are just as
quick to caution that stare decisis has never been “an inexorable command,”
and it is “at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution.”65
All but one of the justices appear to espouse that a departure from
precedent demands “‘special justification,’ over and above the belief ‘that

58. See Re, supra note 3 (suggesting that precedent may no longer have binding force).
59. NCC Staff, The Day the Constitution Was Ratified, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (June 21,
2020), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-day-the-constitution-was-ratified.
60. Feldman, supra note 21.
61. See id.
62. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Supreme Failure, POLITICO (Sept. 29, 2014),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/the-supreme-court-has-failed-111450.
63. Cf. Greenhouse, supra note 26 (“[T]he substitution of one personality for another
matters in real life more than it might seem to matter on paper.”).
64. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019).
65. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 828 (1991)).
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the precedent was wrongly decided.’” 66 During October Term 2018, Justice
Clarence Thomas made unmistakable his view that the Court “should not
follow” “a demonstrably erroneous precedent.”67 Although he may have
articulated similar views in the past, he had never been more emphatic that
“[c]onsiderations beyond the correct legal meaning, including reliance,
workability, and whether a precedent ‘has become well embedded in
national culture,’ . . . are inapposite.”68 In a separate opinion, Justice Neil
M. Gorsuch suggested that “when ‘far-reaching systemic and structural
changes’ make an ‘earlier error all the more egregious and harmful,’ stare
decisis can lose its force.”69 Yet Justice Gorsuch still seems amenable to
referencing considerations beyond demonstrable error when deciding
whether to overrule decisions.70
Aside from Justice Thomas, the current justices seem at least willing to
consider four touchpoints before overruling a decision: “[1] the quality of
the decision’s reasoning; [2] its consistency with related decisions; [3] legal
developments since the decision; and [4] reliance on the decision.”71 In
April 2020, Justice Kavanaugh suggested a slight refinement of these
touchpoints in a solo opinion. Special justifications exist, Justice
Kavanaugh argued, when the decision “is egregiously wrong, it has
significant negative consequences, and overruling it would not unduly upset
reliance interests.”72 Around that time, at least five justices also suggested
to varying degrees that stare decisis is undermined when a decision or rule
is tainted with “racist origins.”73 To the extent there is some consensus on a
66. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1003 (2020) (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266 (2014)); see also Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1969 (“[A]
departure from precedent ‘demands special justification.’”) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey,
467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
67. See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1984 (Thomas, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 1986 (quoting STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S
VIEW 152 (2010)).
69. Id. at 2008 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
70. See id. at 2009 (“[I]f it is clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals’ interest in its
discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement ‘entitlement’ to its persistence.”)
(footnote omitted).
71. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019) (citations omitted).
72. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1420 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
part).
73. See Leah Litman, Ten Thoughts on Ramos v. LA, TAKE CARE (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/ten-thoughts-on-ramos-v-la (“The majority and separate
writings by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kavanaugh emphasize the racist origins of
Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury rule.”).
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framework or standard, actual application bedevils any cohesion and
betrays a court “in crisis.”74
Surveying these and other recent cases, Professor Re suggests that stare
decisis is best understood as “thinking about precedent as a permission, not
a constraint.”75 He argues that “maybe precedent’s applicability does or
should function not as a mandate to rule in a particular way, but rather as
reassurance that a particular approach is lawful.”76 Although Professor Re
portrays stare decisis as “for everyone,” his justification for stare decisis
could not be more jurist-centric.77 He offers two reasons as to why
precedent should be viewed less as a “mandate” and more as providing
“reassurance” that a past approach was correct.78 First, “precedent works as
a shortcut by helping judges and justices decide cases quickly and lawfully
by telling them that it is allowable to follow the path laid by past rulings.”79
Second, “precedent operates as a shield by encouraging judges who have
been critical of precedent to put aside their past views (whether publicly
expressed or not) and start respecting stare decisis.”80 Put differently, stare
decisis is an optional judicial aid in decision-making that should promote
reassurance.
Yet for a doctrine moored in predictability and stability, its cornerstones
are crumbling apace. About 71% of the decisions overruling precedent
under Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. are 5-4.81 This record contrasts with
his immediate predecessor, William H. Rehnquist, whose tenure as chief
justice oversaw only 31% of overrulings cast in 5-4 votes.82 Perhaps this
collision of unyielding positions helps explain why more than half of
Americans believe that the justices are unable to set aside their personal and

74. Linda Greenhouse, A Precedent Overturned Reveals a Supreme Court in Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/opinion/supreme-courtprecedent.html.
75. Re, supra note 3.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Handed Down a Unanimous Decision that Bodes
Ill for the Future of Civil Rights, VOX (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/3/25/
21192320/supreme-court-comcast-decision-civil-rights-mixed-motive-lawsuits.
82. Id.
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political views when deciding constitutional cases.83 It is as if two sides
have ossified, “largely talking past each other.”84
This perception is shaped not just by numbers, but also rhetoric. For
example, in a decision overruling a forty-year-old case about whether a
state can require payment of agency fees to assist public-sector unions, the
majority stressed in 2018 that the past decision “was poorly reasoned,”85 its
rule was “impossible to draw with precision,”86 the “ascendance of publicsector unions has been marked by a parallel increase in public spending,” 87
and “reliance does not carry decisive weight.”88 The dissent claimed that
this overruling “will have large-scale consequences,” not least because,
“[a]cross the country, the relationships of public employees and employers
will alter in both predictable and wholly unexpected ways.”89 The dissent
also accused the majority of “bursting with pride over what it has
accomplished”90 by “weaponizing the First Amendment”91 to overrule
precedent with no justification beyond that “it never liked the decision”92
and “because it wanted to.”93
The following year, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissenting for himself
and three others, explained the difficulty that the justices face when
weighing the application of stare decisis. He made manifest that, while a
course-correction temptation is ever present, stability matters:
And I understand that, because opportunities to correct old errors
are rare, judges may be tempted to seize every opportunity to
overrule cases they believe to have been wrongly decided. But
the law can retain the necessary stability only if this Court resists

83. See Kalvis Golde, Recent Polls Show Confidence in Supreme Court, with Caveats,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 22, 2019, 10:03 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/10/recentpolls-show-confidence-in-supreme-court-with-caveats/ [hereinafter Golde, Confidence with
Caveats].
84. Wermiel, supra note 7.
85. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2479, 2486 (2018).
86. Id. at 2481.
87. Id. at 2483.
88. Id. at 2484.
89. Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2501.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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that temptation, overruling prior precedent only when the
circumstances demand it.94
And similar to Justice Brewer in 1893 and Justice Stevens in 2010, Justice
Breyer said the silent part out loud: “Today’s decision can only cause one
to wonder which cases the Court will overrule next.”95 One month later, and
after another 5-4 overruling, Justice Elena Kagan reiterated the same
concern: “Well, that didn’t take long. Now one may wonder yet again.”96
Around this time, the legal podcast Strict Scrutiny adopted the moniker,
“Stare decisis is for suckers.”97 Perhaps sensing the zeitgeist of the legal
moment, Fifth Circuit Judge Jerry Smith accused fellow panel members in
March 2020 of “rely[ing] on strength in numbers rather than sound legal
principles in order to reach their desired result” in a politically charged
appeal that questioned the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau’s structure.98 His dissent then suggested something never
before expressed in a published opinion by a federal court: “[S]tare decisis
is for suckers.”99
Many spectators believe that this “trend is likely to accelerate” for three
reasons: historic reversal rates, lack of restraint among jurists when
questioning the motives of their colleagues, and the appointment of
“staunchly conservative Justice Brett Kavanaugh” to replace “the relatively
moderate conservative Justice Anthony Kennedy.”100 These circumstances
have caused the progressive justices to stomach, on stare decisis grounds,
precedent that they may not prefer because “they fear their conservative
colleagues plan to overrule many seminal decisions in the future.”101 In
other words, without five votes, the only offense for progressives is a good
defense.

94. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1506 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2190 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
97. See Merchandise, STRICT SCRUTINY PODCAST, https://strict-scrutiny-podcastshop.myshopify.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2020).
98. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., 952 F.3d 591, 603 (5th
Cir.) (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 913 F.3d 573, 574 (5th
Cir. 2019) (mem.), rev’d sub nom. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103
(2020)), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 953 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2020).
99. See id.
100. See Millhiser, supra note 81.
101. Id.
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Bolstered with numbers, inexorable pressure exists for conservatives to
press their advantage.102 For example, Professor Adrian Vermeule
advocated, in the middle of a pandemic, that in a world where “in recent
years, legal conservatism has won the upper hand in the Court and then in
the judiciary generally” conservative justices and judges should turn away
from originalist precepts and seize their opportunity to instantiate “a
substantive moral constitutionalism.”103 Several maxims would dominate
under this conservative theory of “common-good constitutionalism”:
[R]espect for the authority of rule and of rulers; respect for the
hierarchies needed for society to function; solidarity within and
among families, social groups, and workers’ unions, trade
associations, and professions; appropriate subsidiarity, or respect
for the legitimate roles of public bodies and associations at all
levels of government and society; and a candid willingness to
“legislate morality”—indeed, a recognition that all legislation is
necessarily founded on some substantive conception of morality,
and that the promotion of morality is a core and legitimate
function of authority.104
As a result, says the Harvard law professor, the government should, and
possibly must, “judge the quality and moral worth of public speech,” reject
an individual’s right “to define one’s own concept of existence,” enforce
“duties of community and solidarity in the use and distribution of
resources,” and deny “the selfish claims of individuals to private rights.” 105
All is necessary, according to Processor Vermeule, “to ensure that the ruler
has the power needed to rule well.”106 Perceived power, in its barest form
based on counting judicial votes, animates this “ambitious project, one that
abandons the defensive crouch of originalism and that refuses any longer to
play within the terms set by legal liberalism.”107 Professor Vermeule’s

102. See Garrett Epps, Common-Good Constitutionalism Is an Idea as Dangerous as
They Come, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/
common-good-constitutionalism-dangerous-idea/609385/.
103. Adrian Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/common-good-constitutionalism/609037/.
104. Id.
105. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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assessment of the status of the American legal system—and its potential—
is astonishingly and breathtakingly honest.
Whatever one might think about a progressive vision of the Constitution
or the conservative legal project more generally, the fact that the Court is
overruling with greater frequency and less consensus is worse than
problematic. The Court’s current application of stare decisis—largely
through hindsight about the quality of decision-making—is difficult to
explain in a consistent way without betraying the cynical view that
constitutional law is nothing more than politics disguised in black robes. It
leads scholars like Professor Garrett Epps to suggest that certain justices are
acting out of hubris, not least because the “‘I know best about everything’
attitude is excusable (though annoying) in a law professor, whose views cut
no real-world ice with anyone, but they ill-become a judge.”108 “The claim
of authority” to second-guess all precedents, Professor Epps continues, “is
outlandish, and verges on the delusional.”109 For even Justice Antonin
Gregory Scalia would admit some restraint is necessary: “I am an
originalist, but I am not a nut.”110 These sentiments harken back to the
bygone era of Justice Jackson when he said in 1949, in a different time but
not entirely different circumstances: “There is danger that, if the Court does
not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert
the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”111
Perhaps to provide some stability and doctrinal guardrails, Professor
Michael Gerhardt, “an authority on Supreme Court uses of precedent,” has
attempted to define certain decisions that are off limits to reconsideration:
Super precedents are the doctrinal, or decisional, foundations for
subsequent lines of judicial decisions (often but not always in
more than one area of constitutional law). Super precedents are
those constitutional decisions in which public institutions have
heavily invested, repeatedly relied, and consistently supported
over a significant period of time. Super precedents are deeply
embedded into our law and lives through the subsequent
activities of the other branches. Super precedents seep into the
108. See Garrett Epps, Clarence Thomas Is in the Wrong Line of Work, ATLANTIC (Mar.
7, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/clarence-thomas-thinks-heknows-best/584263/.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949).
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public consciousness, and become a fixture of the legal
framework.112
Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel posit a similarly normative
approach in which “constitutional interpretations are truly and finally
settled only when the people accept their wisdom, not simply when the
Supreme Court speaks.”113
Public confidence and trust are the rally points for our “least dangerous”
branch of government.114 And to build back what, to some, has been lost
requires recalibrating stare decisis from an almost pure question of “the
preferences of five justices for overturning settled doctrine” to how much
citizens have empirically relied on, oriented their lives to, and continued to
acclimate to a decision.115
When the justices extoll stare decisis as “promot[ing] the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing]
reliance on judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process,”116 it is worth asking to whose benefit are
those virtues directed? The obvious answer, which no judge would gainsay,
is that these virtues benefit society and the public to whom they are
servants. And the legal system is built for judges to serve the people. The
stare decisis difficulty, then, should be resolved based upon how those
people cope with and arrange their lives around decisions penned by a
historical majority upholding its good-faith oath to the Constitution. It is not
that the quality of past decision-making does not matter. It is just not the
most relevant question to ask.
The stare decisis difficulty can be solved by norms—not theory.
Traditional methods of reviewing a past decision for erudition, quality of
reasoning, and consistency should, of course, play a role in deciding
whether a decision was and is correct. Those touchpoints also can figure
112. Epps, supra note 108 (quoting University of North Carolina law professor Michael
Gerhardt).
113. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, NAT’L CONST. CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/white-papers/democratic-constitution
alism (last visited Sept. 5, 2020).
114. See Joshua D. Hawley, The Most Dangerous Branch, NAT. AFFAIRS, https://www.
nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-most-dangerous-branch (last visited Sept. 5,
2020) (quoting Alexander Hamilton).
115. Wermiel, supra note 7.
116. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019) (quoting Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).
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into whether a decision needs to be overruled. But those jurist-centric,
largely value-laden calls should not supplant how people handle precedent.
Confidence and trust benefit the American legal system writ large when
judges care most about what the evidence says about the facts on the
ground now and later.
This is not a new concept. In 1908, then-attorney Louis D. Brandeis
pioneered what is now known as the “Brandeis Brief,” where he defended
the constitutionality of certain Oregonian labor laws by presenting “a
barrage of social scientific evidence to show the relationship between long
hours, worker health, and public welfare.”117 And it worked: the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the labor laws just three years removed
from Lochner, which had struck down similar laws as violating certain
constitutional liberty interests.118 The effect of a constitutional decision on
the public, all told, should perform the heavy lifting when considering stare
decisis. What is right, or what is wrong, is less salient, especially when case
outcomes turn on only slight majorities.
To envision how a case would look in which judges care less about their
predecessors might seem difficult at first blush. Yet October Term 2019
offers such an example. And perhaps most fittingly, it was a case about a
sunken pirate ship and salvaging its wreckage, so everyone can learn from
and enjoy it.
III. Salvaging an Approach to the Stare Decisis Difficulty
The difficulty judges face when fighting the impulse to overrule
disfavored decisions can be tamed. That can happen if stare decisis is
viewed through the lens of how society has adapted to the good-faith efforts
of those in the past to distill meaning from the “majestic generalities and
ambiguities of”119 phrases written in the late 1700s. It is therefore ironic
that a dispute over a 300-year-old sunken pirate ship materialized into a
civil discussion, which could serve as a model for deciding when to
overrule precedent. This Part discusses the development of state sovereign
117. Nicholas Mosvick, On This Day, the Supreme Court Upholds Limits on Women and
Factory Work Hours, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://constitutioncenter.org/
blog/on-this-day-the-supreme-court-upholds-limits-on-women-and-factory-work-hours.
118. See id.
119. See Randy Barnett, Common-Good Constitutionalism Reveals the Dangers of Any
Non-Originalist Approach to the Constitution, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/dangers-any-non-originalist-approach-constitution/
609382/ (quoting Vermeule, supra note 103).
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immunity, details how a case about a sunken pirate ship was able to dock at
the Supreme Court, and explains how the Court’s decision can serve as an
archetypical guide to a more norms-based approach to stare decisis.
A. A Sunken Ship and Buried Precedents
A case from North Carolina brought together copyrights, patents,
bankruptcy, sovereign immunity, pirates, and (of course) stare decisis.
Edward Teach, better known as Blackbeard, captured a French slave ship in
the West Indies in 1717 and renamed her Queen Anne’s Revenge.120
Boasting roughly forty cannons and a crew of around 300 sailors, Queen
Anne’s Revenge became Blackbeard’s flagship for pirate-related exploits
along the Caribbean and North American coast.121 But just one year later,
her reign over the seas ended when she ran aground on a sandbar about one
mile off the coast of Beaufort, North Carolina.122 Although Blackbeard and
most of his crew survived, the ship sank and lay dormant for nearly three
centuries.123 Yet during those 300 years, while the wreckage awaited
discovery, legal developments occurred apace, some of which would
ultimately decide the fate of Blackbeard’s ship.
Ratified in 1788, sixty years after Queen Anne’s Revenge submerged,
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”124 Five years later, in Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme
Court concluded that individuals could sue states in federal court because
“[w]hen a state, by adopting the Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to
the judicial power of the United States, she has, in that respect, given up her
right of sovereignty.”125 Just one year after the Supreme Court handed
down Chisholm, the states responded by ratifying the Eleventh Amendment
to the Constitution, which explicitly superseded parts of Chisholm,
providing that the “Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.”126 Although
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 (2020).
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 452, 463 (1793).
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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non-textual,127 the “Court has interpreted [the Eleventh Amendment] to
grant states and state agencies broad immunity from private suit by private
individuals, for any remedy, in any court, for violations of federal law.”128
Following the Civil War, the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment,
which provides under Section 1 that no state can “deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,”129 and under Section
5 that “Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.”130 And in a similarly non-textual approach,
appropriate legislation under Section 5 enforcing the substantive provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment “must create a statutory right that is
‘congruent and proportional’ to the constitutional right Congress seeks to
enforce or vindicate.”131
Toward the end of the twentieth century, and against the backdrop of
these constitutional powers, Congress passed the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act of 1990 (CRCA), providing that a State “shall not be
immune, under the Eleventh Amendment . . . or any other doctrine of
sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court” for copyright
infringement,132 and that a state will be liable, and subject to remedies, “to
the same extent as” a private party.133 The CRCA served as “the model for
the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Clarification Act (Patent Remedy
Act),” which became law two years later and denied state sovereign
immunity to allegations of patent infringement in a similar manner.134
Around the time Queen Anne’s Revenge awoke from her 300-year
slumber, the Supreme Court heard three cases with portents bearing on the
ship. In 1996, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court concluded
that Congress could not abrogate sovereign immunity through the exercise

127. See Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1000 (“In our constitutional scheme, a federal court
generally may not hear a suit brought by any person against a nonconsenting State. That bar
is nowhere explicitly set out in the Constitution.”).
128. Howard M. Wasserman, Aaarrrgument Preview: Copyright and Sovereign
Immunity in Davy Jones’ Locker, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 29, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.
scotusblog.com/2019/10/aaarrrgument-preview-copyright-and-sovereign-immunity-in-davyjones-locker/ [hereinafter Wasserman, Aaarrrgument Preview].
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
131. Wasserman, Aaarrrgument Preview, supra note 128.
132. 17 U.S.C. § 511(a) (2018).
133. Id. § 511(b).
134. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 n.1 (2020).
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of its powers under the Indian Commerce Clause.135 The decision planted
some cardinal guideposts to help determine whether Congress may
permissibly pass laws holding states liable. Writing for a 5-4 majority
overruling certain precedents on congressional power, Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed that “the States’ immunity from suit must be obvious
from ‘a clear legislative statement.’” 136 He then sweepingly declared that
“Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed
upon federal jurisdiction.”137 Justices Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
joined a dissent written by Justice David H. Souter, arguing that Congress
may abrogate state sovereign immunity consistent with Article I and the
Eleventh Amendment when the lawsuit invokes a federal interest between a
state and one of its citizens.138
Three years later, in another 5-4 decision by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Court concluded in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank that Congress did not abrogate sovereign
immunity through the Patent Remedies Act, not just because “Congress
may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I
powers,”139 but also because the statutory rights created under the Patent
Remedies Act were not congruent and proportional to the constitutional
right not to be deprived of property without due process.140 Justice Stevens
dissented, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, maintaining that
“[i]t is quite unfair for the Court to strike down Congress’ Act based on an
absence of findings supporting a requirement this Court had not yet
articulated.”141 Justice Stevens also criticized the merits of the 5-4 decision,
which he claimed “threaten[ed] to read Congress’ power to pass
prophylactic legislation out of § 5 altogether.”142

135. 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
136. Id. at 55 (citation omitted).
137. Id. at 73.
138. See id. at 184–85 (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that sovereign immunity should
function differently in the context of cases in federal court by way of federal-question
jurisdiction).
139. 527 U.S. 627, 636, 647–48 (1999) (“These are proper Article I concerns, but that
Article does not give Congress the power to enact such legislation after Seminole Tribe.”).
140. See id. at 647 (“The Patent Remedy Act’s indiscriminate scope offends this
principle [of proportionality and congruence], and is particularly incongruous in light of the
scant support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct that Congress intended to remedy.”).
141. Id. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
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Clinching a relevant trilogy on state sovereign immunity, the Court
handed down Central Virginia Community College v. Katz in 2006,
representing yet another 5-4 decision.143 This time, however, Justice
Stevens wrote for the majority, holding that Congress could subject states to
suit under laws enacted under Article I’s Bankruptcy Clause.144 To
recalibrate the sweeping language of Seminole Tribe and Florida Prepaid
that nothing in Article I could provide a congressional source of power to
suspend state sovereign immunity, Justice Stevens clarified that “we are not
bound to follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now at issue
was not fully debated.”145 Justice Thomas argued for the dissenters that
“nothing in Article I of the Constitution establishes” the power of Congress
to abrogate state sovereign immunity, which “the Court today casts
aside . . . to hold that the States are subject to suit by a rather unlikely class
of individuals—bankruptcy trustees seeking recovery of preferential
transfers for a bankrupt debtor’s estate.”146
State sovereign immunity, although of suspect origin in the constitutional
text, continued to swell in its usage as a defense from suit brought by
private individuals until Katz.147 The question after Katz was whether the
decision signaled a retreat from, and possible jettison of, precedents.
B. The Rediscovery of Both a Pirate Ship and State Sovereign Immunity
Returning to Blackbeard: just as the Supreme Court began handing down
decisions more fully interpreting and explaining the contours of state
sovereign immunity, Intersal Inc., a Palm Bay, Florida, salvage and
research company, discovered the wreckage of Queen Anne’s Revenge in
1996, the same year the Court issued Seminole Tribe.148 Under established
federal and state law, the wreck belongs to North Carolina.149 Intersal
143. 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
144. See id. at 359, 379.
145. Id. at 363 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821)).
146. Id. at 379 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
147. See Michael C. Dorf, Supreme Court Gives States the Green Light to Infringe
Copyrights, VERDICT JUSTIA (Mar. 30, 2020), https://verdict.justia.com/2020/03/30/supremecourt-gives-states-the-green-light-to-infringe-copyrights (explaining the high bar Congress
must meet to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
148. Jess Bravin, Yo Ho Ho: Justices Ponder Rights to Blackbeard Ship-Salvage Images,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2019, 5:13 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/yo-ho-ho-justicesponders-rights-to-blackbeard-ship-salvage-images-11572992004.
149. See 43 U.S.C. § 2105(c) (2018) (“[T]he title . . . to any abandoned shipwreck . . . is
transferred to the State in or on whose submerged lands the shipwreck is located.”); N.C.
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agreed to salvage the vessel, acknowledging North Carolina’s ownership of
the ship, while receiving the right to keep any proceeds from documentary
video and photography.150 In 1998, one year before the Court decided
Florida Prepaid, Intersal engaged Fayetteville, North Carolina-based
videographer Fredrick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions LLC,
to produce videos and photos of the wreck.151 The parties agreed that North
Carolina could “publish accounts and other research documents relating to
the artifacts, site area, and project operations for noncommercial
educational or historical purposes.”152 For over a decade, during which the
Court completed its precedential trilogy with Katz, Allen created videos and
photos of efforts to salvage guns, anchors, and other remains from the
wreckage.153 And he registered copyrights in those works.154
After North Carolina began to publish some of his videos and photos,
Allen initially protested in 2013 that the state was exceeding the agreement
and infringing his copyrights.155 Nautilus and the state agreed to settle the
dispute, with the state paying $15,000, taking down its infringing uses,
promising not to use the material in the future, and marking any of Allen’s
material with a time stamp and watermark.156 The détente was short-lived.
Allen complained shortly after the settlement that North Carolina had
“impermissibly posted five more of his videos online and used one of his
photos in a newsletter.”157 And when Allen and Nautilus demanded that the
state take the new material down, the state responded by enacting
“Blackbeard’s Law,” which designated as a public record all photographs,
video recordings, and other documentary materials of shipwrecks, all while
voiding any previous settlement agreement on wreckage materials.158 With
that, a lawsuit 300 years in the making came to fruition.
In 2015, Allen and Nautilus sued North Carolina and its various officials
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.159 The
GEN. STAT. § 121–122 (1967) (“[T]he title to all shipwrecks . . . which have remained
unclaimed . . . is hereby declared to be in the State of North Carolina . . . .”).
150. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 (2020).
151. Wasserman, Aaarrrgument Preview, supra note 128.
152. Bravin, supra note 148.
153. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 999.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Wasserman, Aaarrrgument Preview, supra note 128.
157. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 999; see also Bravin, supra note 148.
158. See Bravin, supra note 148.
159. Wasserman, Aaarrrgument Preview, supra note 128.
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state then moved to dismiss certain claims on the basis of sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.160 In an extraordinarily candid
decision handed down in March 2017, District Judge Terrence W. Boyle
refused to dismiss the copyright claims, not least because “[i]n this
particular case Congress has clearly abrogated state immunity in cases
arising under the CRCA, and such an abrogation is congruent and
proportional to a clear pattern of abuse by the states.”161
In permitting copyright claims to progress in litigation, Judge Boyle
explained that Supreme Court precedents interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment are “flawed and contrary to the fundamental nature and
meaning of the Constitution,”162 for “[t]he doctrine of state sovereign
immunity to federal law in federal court has frustrated the essential function
of the federal courts to ensure the uniform interpretation and enforcement
of the supreme law of the land.”163 He described how the doctrine (1)
“frustrates the ability of individuals to receive what may be the only
practical remedy available to them as plaintiffs”; (2) “does not enhance
constitutional protections or advance the ideals of our constitutional form of
government in which the people are sovereign”; and (3) “has strangely
turned our federal form of government and the Supremacy Clause on its
head by leaving states free to resist at their pleasure that federal law which
we claim is the supreme law of the land.”164 Judge Boyle concluded by
impugning “the soundness of such a doctrine being imported to words that,
on their very face and plain meaning, do not extend so broadly,” while
“call[ing] for the higher courts to reconsider this doctrine” because he “is
constrained, under the absolute hierarchical system of courts in the federal
judiciary, to hold that the defense of sovereign immunity is available to the
states in federal court.”165
On appeal, Circuit Judge Paul Victor Niemeyer reversed on the issue of
state sovereign immunity in July 2018, concluding that the claims against
North Carolina and its officials must be dismissed.166 The Fourth Circuit’s
analysis was succinct: Florida Prepaid controls the outcome, Congress did

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 531 (E.D.N.C. 2017).
See id. at 540.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 538.
Id.
Id. at 540.
Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2018).
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not “validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity,” and the sovereignimmunity provision under the CRCA is invalid as a result.167
Allen filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court presenting this
question: “Whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity
via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act in providing remedies for
authors of original expression whose federal copyrights are infringed by
states.”168 The Supreme granted certiorari a few months later.169
The merits-stage briefing offered differing takes on what the precedential
trilogy meant.170 Allen argued that Congress properly abrogated state
sovereign immunity under both Article I and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment because Katz overruled the dicta in Seminole Tribe upon which
Florida Prepaid relied.171 Katz established a clause-by-clause analysis,
Allen asserted, which clarified that the text of Article I gives Congress
exclusive power over copyrights and that state encroachment in this area
would be “repugnant” to that power.172 In support of Congress’s authority
under Section 5, Allen maintained that the CRCA is congruent and
proportional to the constitutional protections against both deprivation of
property without due process and uncompensated takings of property, not
least because Congress “compiled a robust legislative record, showing a
pattern of copyright infringement by states and the absence of any
satisfactory remedy” other than state-law damages actions.173 North
Carolina responded by arguing that Florida Prepaid should control the
outcome and that Katz—rather than overruling Florida Prepaid sub
silentio—“rested on the unique features of bankruptcy.”174
The vast majority of amicus briefs favored Allen’s position, including
those submitted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Copyright Alliance,
and Dow Jones & Company.175 Beyond formal filings, Professor Adam
Mossoff’s commentary in the Wall Street Journal asserted that the original
meanings of Article I and the Eleventh Amendment suggest that states
167. Id. at 354.
168. Aurora Barnes, Petitions of the Week, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 1, 2019, 9:39 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/03/petitions-of-the-week-33/.
169. Allen v. Cooper, 139 S. Ct. 2664, 2665 (2019) (mem.).
170. See Wasserman, Aaarrrgument Preview, supra note 128.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Allen v. Cooper, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/allenv-cooper/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2020).
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cannot plunder property with impunity.176 In support of North Carolina, the
Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities and the Association of
American Universities offered a perspective not covered in the other briefs.
“Preserving state sovereign immunity helps protect [the] strong public
purpose of state universities,” the associations argued.177 “The unlawful
abrogation of state sovereign immunity,” they continued, “will cause state
universities to face numerous meritless copyright-infringement suits for
damages.”178
When the Supreme Court heard the case in November 2019, Professor
Howard Wasserman suggested that some of the justices seemed skeptical of
blatant attempts by states to pirate copyrighted material in reliance on their
sovereign immunity.179 Derek Shaffer, the attorney representing Allen and
Nautilus, fielded questions from Justices Ginsburg, Samuel A. Alito Jr.,
Kagan, and Kavanaugh about Florida Prepaid and whether that precedent
controls the outcome.180 In an exchange with Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor,
Shaffer argued that it would be “‘antithetical’ to say that any government
can infringe the rights Congress has secured.”181 After Justices Alito and
Kagan asked why a congressional record of sixteen documented instances
of copyright infringement were enough when eight instances of patent
176. Adam Mossoff, Stop the States’ Copyright Plunder, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2019, 6:11
PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stop-the-states-copyright-plunder-11572909070?
shareToken=st3d1d0fb9cb0649beb30efa4903b9cce7 (“Founders intended that states be
bound by the same copyright laws as individuals and private organizations, and Congress
recognized the problem of state copyright piracy and enacted the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act of 1990 to abrogate state sovereign immunity and allow claims such as Mr.
Allen’s.”).
177. Mark Walsh, U.S. Supreme Court Rules on Race-Bias in Contracting, Copyright
Immunity, EDUC. WK. (Mar. 23, 2020, 5:05 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/school_
law/2020/03/supreme_court_issues_rac.html.
178. Id.
179. See Howard M. Wasserman, Argument Analysis: Justices Pillage State Arguments
for Sovereign Immunity for Copyright Infringement, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 6, 2019, 11:20
AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/11/argument-recap-justices-pillage-state-arguments
-for-sovereign-immunity-for-copyright-infringement/ (“[Justice Brett] Kavanaugh and
Justice Stephen Breyer questioned Park about the possibility of multiple, rampant state uses
of copyrights for which the authors receive nothing. . . . [Justice] Ginsburg suggested that
there is ‘something unseemly’ about a state’s being able to hold copyrights and sue for
infringement of their copyrights but also to say, ‘we can infringe to our heart’s content and
be immune from any compensatory damages.’”) [hereinafter Wasserman, Argument
Analysis].
180. Id.
181. Id.
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infringement did not create a sufficient record in Florida Prepaid, Shaffer
responded, “the reality is Congress saw the tip of the iceberg of this
problem.”182 Justice Kagan pressed further about the difference between
Florida Prepaid and this case: “Now what’s the difference between the
two—other than eight” documented instances of infringement.183 Shaffer
attempted to mollify that point by observing that “patent infringement could
be innocent,” whereas copyright infringement involves some measure of
intentionality.184
North Carolina Deputy Solicitor General Ryan Park received difficult
questioning about the state’s brazen appropriation of copyrighted works. 185
Justice Ginsburg commented that this case “sounds pretty intentional to
me,” and that there is “‘something unseemly’ about a state’s being able to
hold copyrights and sue for infringement” but also maintain that it “can
infringe to [its] heart’s content and be immune from any compensatory
damages.”186 Justice Breyer questioned whether a state could create its own
online streaming service by “charging $5 or something to run ‘Rocky,’
‘[Captain] Marvel,’ ‘Spider-Man’ and perhaps ‘Groundhog Day,’” all of
which would result in “[s]everal billion dollars flow[ing] into the
treasury.”187 “Now, if you win,” he pressed Park, “why won’t that
happen?”188 Justice Sotomayor likewise reflected on how she found
Blackbeard’s Law “deeply troubling,” but also wondered what could be
done after Florida Prepaid.189 Toward the end of the argument, Justice
Breyer posed a hypothetical about the prospect of “the University of
California making 50,000 unauthorized copies of a Norman Mailer book
available to students.”190 He expressed concern about “the risk of unfairness
to authors and inventors alike,” lamenting that Congress “could perhaps try
again to abrogate state immunity in a way that passes constitutional
muster.”191
Although the import of Florida Prepaid dominated the argument, many
predicted that Allen would prevail. Writing for USA Today, Richard Wolf
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Bravin, supra note 148 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Wasserman, Argument Analysis, supra note 179.
See id.
Id.
Bravin, supra note 148 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Walsh, supra note 177 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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seemed confident that “[t]he Supreme Court appeared likely Tuesday to
rule that North Carolina’s display of a 300-year-old pirate ship’s salvage
operation amounts to piracy.”192 So too did Professor Wasserman.193 But a
lot changed in the world between November 2019 and March 2020.
C. What Copyright Pirates of Pirate Copyrights Can Teach About Respect
for Precedent
The Supreme Court released its decision in Allen v. Cooper on March 23,
2020, affirming the Fourth Circuit and concluding that Congress did not
properly abrogate state sovereign immunity when it passed the CRCA.194
On that day, in a major departure from its normal practice due to COVID19 concerns, the justices issued four opinions without taking the bench.195
The public learned of the decisions released that day by checking the
postings on the Court’s website.196 The Court posted its first decision at
10:00 a.m.197 and its decision in Allen v. Cooper roughly five minutes
later.198 This was the first time that the Court issued an opinion without
taking the bench since Bush v. Gore—the case that “effectively decided the
2000 election”—which was “heard and decided over the justices’ winter
break.”199 It was, in many ways, eerie, especially for those who thought
they “knew, that as sure as the cherry trees would bloom in the last two
192. Richard Wolf, Aarrr, Matey! Supreme Court Justices Frown on State’s Public
Display of Pirate Ship’s Salvage Operation, USA TODAY (Nov. 5, 2019, 2:42 PM ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/11/05/legendary-pirate-blackbeardsshipwreck-sails-supreme-court/4166346002/.
193. See Howard Wasserman, States Can Pirate and Plunder Copyrighted Material All
They Want, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 23, 2020, 4:16 PM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2020/03/states-can-pirate-and-plunder-copyrighted-material-all-they-want.html
[hereinafter Wasserman, Pirate and Plunder].
194. See Howard M. Wasserman, Opinion Analysis: Congress Cannot Subject States to
Suit for Pirating and Plundering Copyrighted Material, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2020, 2:43
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/03/opinion-analysis-congress-cannot-subject-statesto-suit-for-pirating-and-plundering-copyrighted-material/.
195. Kalvis Golde, Live Blog of Orders and Opinions (Update: Completed),
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2020, 8:45 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/03/live-blogof-orders-and-opinions-48/ [hereinafter Golde, Live Blog].
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. Jess Bravin & Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Rules on Race, Copyright and
Deportation, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2020, 7:44 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
supreme-court-rules-on-race-copyright-and-deportation-11585005759.
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weeks of March, the justices would be on the bench.”200 Amid the
handwringing about the value of precedent and perceived consequences of
destabilizing the rule of law, hitting refresh on a computer to see newly
issued opinions emphasized that having ivory-tower concerns is a luxury,
easily displaced and never again to be taken for granted.201
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.202 Justice Thomas
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, while Justice Breyer,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment.203 And Justice
Kagan’s opinion read like a paean to stare decisis, while still exemplifying
how to craft a decision focused on the public’s interest in precedent and the
parties’ burden to demonstrate why a departure is necessary.
Justice Kagan began by explaining that “our decision in Florida Prepaid
compels the same conclusion” that Congress acted without proper authority
in abrogating state sovereign immunity when it passed the CRCA.204
Without derogating any precedent, the Court explained that, despite it
“nowhere explicitly set out in the Constitution,” “[i]n our constitutional
scheme, a federal court generally may not hear a suit brought by any person
against a nonconsenting State.”205 In assessing Allen’s arguments that
Congress acted consistent with its powers under Article I and Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court made clear that “[t]he slate on which
we write today is anything but clean,” and that “Florida Prepaid, along
with other precedent, forecloses each of Allen’s arguments.”206 In the spirit
of fealty to precedent, the Court acknowledged that “stare decisis . . . is a
‘foundation stone of the rule of law.’”207
Addressing Congress’s powers under Article I to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, the Court explained that Florida Prepaid “already
rejected [this] theory,” which compelled the reasoning, “if not the Patent
Remedy Act, not its copyright equivalent either, and for the same
200. Linda Greenhouse, Will the Supreme Court Protect ‘Ministers’ from Their Church?,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/26/opinion/supreme-courtreligion-discrimination.html?auth=login-email&login=email&searchResultPosition=1.
201. See id.
202. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 997 (2020).
203. Id. at 1007 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
1008 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
204. Id. at 999, 1007.
205. Id. at 1000.
206. Id. at 1001.
207. Id. at 1003 (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798
(2014)).
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reason.”208 The Court also rejected the argument that Katz refined the
analysis under Florida Prepaid and Seminole Tribe, explaining “the opinion
reflects what might be called bankruptcy exceptionalism,” in which the
Bankruptcy Clause is “sui generis—again, ‘unique’—among Article I’s
grants of authority.”209 Justice Kagan noted that, while the Court “view[s]
bankruptcy as on a different plane,” there is “[n]othing in that
understanding” which “invites the kind of general, ‘clause-by-clause’
reexamination of Article I that Allen proposes.”210
As for Congress’s power to pass the CRCA under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court intoned that “Florida Prepaid again
serves as the critical precedent.”211 The Court observed how Florida
Prepaid had “determined that the [Patent Reform Act’s] abrogation of
immunity—again, the equivalent of the CRCA’s—was out of all proportion
to what it found” to justify eliminating state sovereign immunity.212 And in
offering a model for how to apply precedent, the Court referenced its past
analysis as both “the starting point of our inquiry here,” as well as “the
ending point too unless the evidence of unconstitutional infringement is
materially different for copyrights than patents.”213 The Court then
determined that “the concrete evidence of States infringing copyrights
(even ignoring whether those acts violate due process) is scarcely more
impressive than what the Florida Prepaid Court saw.”214 In view of the
“exceedingly slight” constitutional injuries that the Patent Remedy Act
sought and the CRCA seeks to vindicate, “[i]t follows that the balance the
laws strike between constitutional wrong and statutory remedy is
correspondingly askew.”215
Justice Kagan also addressed stare decisis with an eye not toward
rehashing old arguments, but instead addressing whether the parties
provided evidence that society has adjusted to a point that now demands a
different result.216 This approach salved whatever bitter debates could have
been reignited through relitigating which decisions are better reasoned than
208. Id. at 1002.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 1003.
211. Id. at 1005.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1006.
215. Id. at 1007.
216. See id. at 1003 (“To reverse a decision, we demand a ‘special justification,’ over and
above the belief ‘that the precedent was wrongly decided.’”).
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others. For Allen to win, by the Court’s accounting, he had to convince at
least five justices that “‘special justification,’ over and above the belief
‘that the precedent was wrongly decided’” warranted upsetting a
“foundation stone of the rule of law.”217 That “Florida Prepaid was wrong”
because “the decision misjudged Congress’s authority,”218 the Court
concluded, is “nothing special at all.”219 A bare “charge of error alone . . .
cannot overcome stare decisis.”220
The decision also provided a pathway forward for Congress and litigants
with hopes of “bring[ing] digital Blackbeards to justice.”221 After all,
“going forward, Congress will know those rules,” “would presumably
approach the issue differently than when it passed the CRCA,” and “if it
detects violations of due process, then it may enact a proportionate
response” to “effectively stop States from behaving as copyright pirates.”222
The same is true of advocates. That is because “Florida Prepaid all but
prewrote” how lawyers should approach these issues.223
Justice Thomas concurred in part and concurred in the judgment,
identifying “two disagreements and one question that remains open for
resolution in a future case.”224 He first repeated his position from 2019 that
the Court has an obligation to overrule “demonstrably erroneous”
decisions.225 He then admonished that courts should “not purport to advise
Congress on how it might exercise its legislative authority, nor give [their]
blessing to hypothetical statutes or legislative records not at issue here.” 226
He concluded by suggesting that “whether copyrights are property within
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
remains open.”227
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, offered an almost farewell-toarms-style concurrence in the judgment. He began by suggesting that,
“when proven to have pirated intellectual property, States must pay for
217. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014)).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 1007.
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
225. Id. at 1008 (quoting Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
226. Id.
227. Id.
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what they plundered.”228 He then offered some optimism that “perhaps
Congress will venture into this great constitutional unknown” and fashion a
statute comporting with the majority’s reasoning. And his conclusion
reiterated his enduring view that “something is amiss” with the Court’s
sovereign-immunity precedents, citing various dissents he either joined or
authored.229 Yet, resigned to the conclusion that his “longstanding view has
not carried the day, and that the Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid
controls this case,” he concurred in the judgment simpliciter.230 It was
classy, displaying no grudge or disrespect to his colleagues past or present.
And for a justice self-isolating due to COVID-19 with “his wife, daughter
and three grandchildren” under one roof, all while regularly cooking Italian
pot roast for his family, it was a peaceful opinion.231
Commentators hailed the decision as victory for the value of precedent
and stare decisis. The hosts of Strict Scrutiny celebrated that “stare decisis
is not for suckers, at least when Justice Kagan is writing.”232 Lisa Soronen
of the State and Local Legal Center remarked that it “is significant for
states in the big picture because the [C]ourt held the line on its sovereign
immunity precedent.”233 Nina Totenberg of NPR suggested that the
“opinion was couched in terms of deference to precedent—namely in this
case, the precedents of the last 26 years.”234 Professor Re offered that,
despite a “famously controversial and complicated” area of the law,
“instead of going to first-principles, members of the majority could
coalesce easily around a shared analysis and conclusion, without having to
reinvent the jurisprudential wheel.”235 Professor Wasserman was succinct:
“this is a 9-0 case—everyone agreeing that the statute is invalid in light of
228. Id. at 1009 (Breyer, J., concurring).
229. Id. (collecting cases).
230. Id.
231. See Jess Bravin, For a Supreme Court Justice on Lockdown, Debates Now Focus on
Video Night, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2020, 3:31 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-asupreme-court-justice-on-lockdown-debates-now-focus-on-video-night-11585769494.
232. Build a Bridge, STRICT SCRUTINY PODCAST, http://strictscrutinypodcast.com/
podcast/build-a-bridge/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2020).
233. Lisa Soronen, States Win SCOTUS Pirate/Sovereign Immunity Copyright Case,
NCSL (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/blog/2020/03/23/states-win-scotus-piratesovereign-immunity-copyright-case.aspx.
234. Nina Totenberg, In Blackbeard Pirate Ship Case, Supreme Court Scuttles Copyright
Claims, NPR (Mar. 24, 2020, 5:06 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/24/820381016/inblackbeard-pirate-ship-case-supreme-court-scuttles-copyright-claims.
235. Re, supra note 3.
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Florida Prepaid.”236 Professor Michael Dorf reflected that “stare decisis—
the obligation of courts to adhere to precedents absent a ‘special
justification’—pretty much commanded the result in Allen.”237 He also put
forth the idea that the progressive justices’ willingness to preserve staterights precedents might have been offered to entice at least one
conservative justice to vote in favor of certain progressive precedents. 238
Tom Goldstein, publisher of the inestimable SCOTUSblog, offered the
nuanced view that a “generational divide” may exist among the progressive
justices in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan “seemingly accept”
precedents that Justices Ginsburg and Breyer “would overrule.”239
These commentators are correct. But the decision could stand for more.
D. Stare Decisis as a Norms-Based Solution
Stare decisis scored a win in the result, but the real victory of Allen v.
Cooper could be in its use as a template for deciding cases. Issues of first
impression in constitutional law are infrequent, so the opportunity for
modern judges to write tableau rosa is rare. And when the “slate on which
[they] write . . . is anything but clean,”240 there is a benefit to focusing less
on whether precedent is erudite and more on whether evidence is available
to show how society is ready and requires something different.
Justice Kagan did not praise or derogate the Court’s jurisprudence on
state sovereign immunity, offering only the uncontroversial observation that
the doctrine “is nowhere explicitly set out in the Constitution.”241 And
rather than revisiting old arguments and erstwhile views on federalism and
our constitutional order, the two justices who dissented in the past simply
acknowledged that their “longstanding view has not carried the day, and
that the Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid controls this case.”242 Although
Justice Thomas maintained his pertinacious view on how to apply stare
decisis, that separate writing in no way suggested that his colleagues either

236. Wasserman, Pirate and Plunder, supra note 193.
237. Dorf, supra note 147.
238. See id. (“By accepting controversial state sovereign immunity precedents that the
Courtʼs conservative wing set in the 1990s, perhaps the Courtʼs liberal justices are offering a
kind of deal: We will preserve your statesʼ rights precedents, so you should preserve our
abortion rights precedents.”).
239. Golde, Live Blog, supra note 195.
240. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1001 (2020).
241. Id. at 1000.
242. Id. at 1009 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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arrogated power or abdicated their duties.243 That opinion also did not
revive any of the dissenting positions from Katz.244 Instead of a debate red
in tooth and claw, it was clean, cordial, and even breezy.
Perhaps as a product of deflecting attention away from the justices’
views on rightly and wrongly decided cases, legal commentators accepted
Allen v. Cooper, despite misgivings that “the Court’s sovereign immunity
doctrine is a mess of its own making.”245 Some assert that the state
sovereign immunity doctrine “rests on a highly dubious construction of the
constitutional text, serves a largely symbolic interest in the ‘dignity’ of the
states, and includes an extremely complex and mutually contradictory set of
rules, exceptions, and exceptions to the exceptions.”246 And yet
“[p]reserving the existing body of state sovereign immunity doctrine might
be necessary to preserve other more valuable doctrines as part of a stare
decisis bargain.”247 The decision, in effect, blunted criticism of “the product
of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture,”248 by
couching the result in terms of what was foreordained by the past. This
approach carries a constructive value to society, not least because the
media’s treatment of judicial decisions affects the public’s perception of the
courts.249
243. Compare id. at 1007–08 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment), with Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 695 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari) (“Regrettably, Brand X has taken this Court to the precipice of
administrative absolutism. Under its rule of deference, agencies are free to invent new
(purported) interpretations of statutes and then require courts to reject their own prior
interpretations. Brand X may well follow from Chevron, but in so doing, it poignantly lays
bare the flaws of our entire executive-deference jurisprudence. Even if the Court is not
willing to question Chevron itself, at the very least, we should consider taking a step away
from the abyss by revisiting Brand X.”), and VF Jeanswear LP v. EEOC, 140 S. Ct. 1202,
1204 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“This doctrine [of
deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations] has rightly fallen out of favor in
recent years, as it directly conflicts with the constitutional duty of a judge to faithfully and
independently interpret the law.”) (citations omitted)).
244. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
245. Dorf, supra note 147.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. See Katerina Linos & Kimberly Twist, Legal Scholarship Highlight: The Supreme
Court, the Media and Public Opinion, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 24, 2017, 10:19 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/02/legal-scholarship-highlight-supreme-court-mediapublic-opinion/.
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In raw terms of stare decisis becoming more of a solution than a
problem, the decision bore legitimacy because society had oriented to the
constitutional order dictated by precedent without fissuring to demand a
different outcome. No justice can be accused of playing politics when
precedent directs a certain result and the parties fail to marshal evidence or
justifiable reasoning as to why society demands a different outcome. And
when more than half of Americans believe that the justices cannot set aside
their personal and political views when interpreting the Constitution, Allen
v. Cooper’s telescopic shift in how cases are viewed and decided is a
welcomed development.250
A retreat from a preoccupation over whether jurists of the past followed
certain prescriptions of interpretation or held fidelity to a particular method
or mode of analysis makes sense. After all, one aim of the American legal
system is to fashion a rule that “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the
judicial process.”251 To these ends, it is the fluidity of society, not a change
in who occupies a seat on bench, that should be the source of understanding
when precedent loses evenhandedness or undermines the systematic
integrity of the American legal system. Focusing on the public defangs the
impulse to upset fighting faiths.
The decision further represents how norms, public expectations, and
societal aspirations can play a cardinal role in cases touching on stare
decisis. Norms take primacy, in this instance, over political philosophy. The
Court was candid in its assessment of precedent; it was neither pugnacious
nor tendentious. Its analysis tracked and explained what litigants must do
for precedent to work in their favor. It also provided a pathway to reach a
distinguishable result. And it clarified that, if outright overruling of
precedent is required, convincing the justices that their predecessors’ goodfaith efforts were “wrong” by itself is “nothing special at all.”252 Although
the Court did not catalogue every ingredient that could go into crafting a
special justification, it baked into the process an onus on litigants to provide
evidence in their favor. And upon detection of previously unknown, or
difficult to perceive as is, constitutional violations suffered by the public
that come into view based on a matured understanding of society and its
250. See Golde, Confidence with Caveats, supra note 83.
251. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019) (quoting Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).
252. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1003 (2020).
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future, precedent should not prevent judicial action “tailored” to
“effectively stop” the government—state or federal—“from behaving as . . .
pirates.”253 So when the system begins thinking of the public as the suckers
who suffer most when norms are bulldozed, their interests move from being
an afterthought to a foreground influence. Being a sucker (or pirate) is not
so bad under those terms.
In an insular world—one where only 439 lucky individuals can sit in the
justice’s courtroom while in session—a more inclusive approach to
decision-making could make the least accessible branch of government
more attuned to the people it serves.254 The stare decisis difficulty is only
that if judges continue with a jurist-centric analysis. Nothing prevents
judges from placing greater emphasis on precedent’s continued role in
society and whether evidence might demonstrate a need for a fresh, revised
approach. Depressurizing tension in this area may indeed demand this
approach. Far from a difficulty, the latter would be the stare decisis
solution. And for that, Justice Kagan’s opinion provides an example of how
a decision should look forward, not into the past, to decide whether
precedent should dictate the outcome of a dispute. Allen v. Cooper, in sum,
represents hope.
IV. Conclusion
Citing Winston Churchill, Justice Gorsuch observed “that the world is
divided into people who own their governments and governments who own
their people, and it is vital we never cross that line.”255 The American legal
system belongs to the people. And their “[l]iberty finds no refuge in a
jurisprudence of doubt.”256 The fighting faiths of justices and judges will no
doubt endure ad infinitum. But the privilege to have those faiths etched into
legal history is a license granted to them by the people they serve.
Normative expectations matter. And the difficulty of stare decisis is not so
difficult when those fighting faiths yield to instead reflect on the public, the
253. See id. at 1007.
254. See Amy Howe, Courtroom Access: The Nuts and Bolts of Courtroom Seating – and
the Lines for Public Access, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 1, 2020, 1:06 PM), https://www.scotusblog
.com/2020/04/courtroom-access-the-nuts-and-bolts-of-courtroom-seating-and-the-lines-togain-access-to-the-courtroom/.
255. Calvin Terbeek, Original Scholarship and Conservative Politics, NEW RAMBLER
(Oct. 9, 2019), https://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/originalist-scholarship-andconservative-politics (citation omitted).
256. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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societal considerations upon which the legal system is built, and the rights
that the system is designed to protect. Stare decisis provides reassurances
that are shared by judges, lawyers, pirates, suckers, and all others. The
public should trust and take courts at their word. Courts should do the same,
unless society demonstrates that change is necessary.
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